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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MENTION TESTIMONY GIVEN BY ONE OF
THE OFFICERS PRESENT DURING THE TRAFFIC STOP
Despite the existence of contradictory credible testimony,
the State cites this Court only to testimony it believes supports
its assertion that the baggy containing methamphetamine was pulled
from Appellant's pocket prior to any patdown search. The
following is an example:
Appellee's Br. At 7; However, since the baggy was not
the product of a patdown search (citations omitted),
any discussion about a patdown is irrelevant.;
Appellee's Br.At 9; The officer had not yet conducted a
patdown search when he asked defendant if he had any
weapons (citations omitted), and did not know that the
bulge in defendant's pocket was not a weapon (citation
omitted).
Despite the state's reliance on this testimony, Officer John
McMahon testified that Officer Graham, the officer in question,
did in fact conduct a patdown search of Appellant immediately
after Appellant exited his vehicle—prior to the baggy being
discovered in Appellant's pocket. The following colloquy took
place at the Preliminary Hearing between the prosecutor and
Officer McMahon:
(Beginning on P.7 L.17);

A: From there he [Graham] stated for my safety and t h i s
Trooper's safety, as he pointed t o me, " I ' d l i k e t o perform a
t e r r y frisk [ s i c ] . " He had him face away from him, began
squeezing h i s p o c k e t s t o check for any weapons t h a t he
may have had in h i s p o c k e t .
1

Q: And where were you standing when this was being
accomplished?
A: I was to the right of Trooper Graham and Mr* Cerroni,
approximately two feet away.
(Emphasis added).
Later, at the Suppression Hearing, McMahon again testified
that Officer Graham did perform a patdown search of Appellant
prior to discovery of the baggy.
(R.199 L.7);
Q: What happened next?
A: Graham had escorted, guided the defendant to the rear of
the vehicle in preparation of performing Field Sobriety
tests. Graham had asked him if he had any weapons in his
pockets. He saw a bulge in the pants pocket, as did I. I
saw Trooper Graham's hand go down to pat the pocket.
He asked the defendant what was in his pocket, he said, from
what I recall, "Nothing, it's a watch." then he voluntarily
pulled, it was a watch on a chain, voluntarily pulled that
from his right front pants [sic] pocket.
(Emphasis added).
McMahon testified to the following on cross-examination:
(R.206 L.24);
Q: Okay, then your testimony was also that Trooper Graham
actually informed Mr. Cerroni that for his safety and for the
officer's safety he was going to perform a Terry frisk on
him, correct?
A: Yes, as I stated because he did observe a bulge in his
pocket from the watch.
Q: So prior to Mr. Cerroni pulling the pocket watch out of
his pocket, pulling on the chain, Trooper Graham had informed
him he was going to do a Terry frisk, correct?
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A: As he was, yes, as he was walking him from the driver seat
to the back of his vehicle, he advised him for his safety
that he was going to do a Terry frisk and began
patting the outside of his pocket.
Q: Began, as soon as he advised him of that he began patting
the outsides [sic] of his pocket?
A: Just simultaneously while they were walking to the
rear of his vehicle.
(Emphasis added)•
The State argues in Point IV of its Brief that Defendant's
argument rests on a false premise.
Appellee's Br. At 9; Defendant argues that the officer
had no right to inquire about the object in defendant's
pocket once he was convinced it was not a
weapon...Defendant's argument rests on a false premise.
The officer had not yet conducted a patdown search when
he asked defendant if he had any weapons (citations
omitted).
The above cited portions of the Record clearly indicate that
such was not the case:
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 7 line 17);
"From there he stated for my safety and this Trooper's
safety, as he pointed to me, 'I'd like to perform a
terry [sic] frisk.' He had him face away from him, began
squeezing his pockets to check for any weapons that he
may have had in his pocket. Et.Al.
Appellant fails to see how the argument which was made in his
Brief rests on a "false premise"—the patdown search did in fact
occur, and the State misguides this Court when it fails to
recognize such evidence.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED CREDIBLE IN FAVOR OF
INCREDIBLE EVIDENCE
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court has broad
discretion when it evaluates evidence and facts, "[nevertheless,
this certainly does not extend to an arbitrary and unreasoning
power to disregard credible, uncontradicted evidence and make
findings inconsistent therewith and issue an order based thereon."
See, Kino v. Kino, 478 P.2d 492, 495-96 (Utah 1970).

Appellant is

aware that such findings will not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous.

State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1976).

Appellant, however, asks this Court to review the issues under an
abuse of discretion standard since the trial court misapplied the
law to the facts. See, Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942
P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997).
Appellant has clearly laid out the facts in the case at bar:
1) Graham, a Utah Highway Patrolman, testified he did not, at any
time, ever touch Appellant—he simply asked Appellant a question;
2) McMahon, also a Utah Highway Patrolman, testified that Graham
did in fact touch Appellant; 3) McMahon testified that Graham
"began patting the outside of his [Appellant's] pocket...while
they were walking to the rear of his vehicle.

(R. 207).

Appellant argues that the trial court's decision to disregard
one patrolman's credible evidence, in favor of another's
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inconsistent and incredible testimony, was clearly erroneous, or
in the alternative at least an abuse of discretion.
Graham's testimony was less credible because it was his
search that was being questioned.

His testimony, Appellant

argues, should be presumed to be biased in light of McMahon's
testimony which was more credible because McMahon had more to
lose—he was testifying that a fellow officer violated Appellant's
Constitutional rights. His testimony was against his and the
State's interest. The trial court's refusal to adopt this more
credible evidence was clearly erroneous.
POINT III
APPELLANT PRAYS FOR THIS COURT TO ESTABLISH A DUTY THAT
THE STATE CITE THE REVIEWING COURT TO ALL RELEVANT
EVIDENCE
Professor and well respected trial lawyer Moses Lasky stated
the following regarding the duties of judges and lawyers:
An opinion writer is entitled to the greatest leeway in
his law as in his reasoning, for they are his. But
honesty allows no leeway in his statement of the facts,
for they are not his. There is no substitute whatever
for adherence to the exact and precise record in the
case. No 'result-orientation' can justify omission of a
single relevant fact or the inclusion of a single
factual statement that is false. This should go without
saying. Unfortunately it needs saying.
Moses Lasky, A Return to the Observatory Below the Bench, 19 Sw.
L.J. 679, 689 (1965).
Appellant argues that the State's failure to observe the
standard above should not be overlooked by this Court. By
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disregarding this standard, the State turns the pursuit of justice
into a contest between attorneys—advocacy is a noble pursuit, but
truth should be paramount.
CONCLUSION
Appellant prays that this Court disregard the State's
argument that no patdown search occurred in this case. The
evidence is clear that a patdown search did occur and that the
trial court's decision to the contrary was clearly erroneous. Had
the trial court correctly concluded that it had occurred, the
evidence which was derived from the illegal search would have been
suppressed.
DATED this

day of September, 1998.

Wayne Freestone
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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